

Transatlantic Security Relations: Consequences for Austria

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Traditional security thinking dominated the Cold War. Reliance on military capabilities was the primary strategy adopted to achieve greater security. In the new post-1989 world, and in particular post- 9/11, a broader and more complex concept of security has emerged. With the end of the Cold War, attention was thus given to building more sophisticated and integrated security concepts and developing frameworks designed to embrace a more comprehensive construct for security. The dramatic shift in threat perceptions brought about by the fall of communism have been confirmed by a wide variety of post-September 11 development: Wars between competing political ideologies and inter-state conflicts are no longer seen as the prime dangers to international security. The real security risks in the near future seem to come not from strong and stable governments but from failed and collapsed states. This paper examines both the impact of the developments before and after September 11 on both NATO and European Security, in particular on the transatlantic relations in general.

Robert Kagan put the new relations succinctly: “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand one another less and less.” Americans believe that world order ultimately rests on military power; Europeans, by contrast, are wedded to a vision in which an orderly world is constructed on the basis of international law and multilateral institutions. Yet, Kagan argues, the Europeans are deluding themselves. They are only able to reject militarism because the United States is there to take on the security challenges of the world.

By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted away from collective defense. Based on the assumption that alliances can hardly survive without a sufficient threat, some analysts predicted after the end of the East-West conflict NATO's demise altogether. No alliance in history survived its enemy for very long. So it had to adapt and transform itself more and more. Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of the post-Cold War security system. Since the end of the East-West conflict NATO underwent a significant transformation process that has been speeded

up by the terror attacks of September 11. Again, NATO was at risk of becoming irrelevant in a world in which terrorism has become the principal strategic threat. Founded as a collective defense organization at the onset of the Cold War, NATO had to revise its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats. The invocation of its Art. 5 security commitments for a war that took place not on NATO-territory changed the meaning of this article together with Art. 6 that prescribes this area. With NATO enlargement, a greater role for Russia, NATO's small military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO seemed likely to lose or at least to change radically its traditional roll of collective defense. At the Prague summit the heads of governments approved the formation of a Rapid-Response force of around 20,000 troops that would be deployable within 30 days to deal with the new threats of the 21st century wherever they are needed. In the framework of the Prague Capabilities Commitment individual countries will also have to commit themselves to provide specific equipment and expertise within set deadlines. In the case of Iraq Germany, France and Belgium blocked the start of NATO military planning to protect Turkey against the threat of an Iraqi missile attack. Subsequently, Turkey has requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that states that NATO's members will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any NATO country is threatened. With the "post-cold war era" NATO's traditional role as a collective defense organization was coming to a close. NATO together with its PfP could become a military "toolbox" for "coalitions of the willing."

Austria called upon its neutrality during the war with Iraq since there was no explicit authorization by the UN-Security Council for the intervention of the war coalition. It closed its air space for the planes of the war waging states. So, Austria had much more room of maneuver than the members of anti-war coalition that are members of NATO who also argued that an UN mandate would be the precondition for their military aid. Austria is member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Many of NATO's partners are contributing to ISAF, building on their experience of working with the Alliance in the Balkans over many years. As such Austria can provide equipment and personnel for the "NATO-toolbox" if it is willing and able to do so like other Partners, e.g. Uzbekistan during the war in Afghanistan. At Prague NATO agreed to introduction of Individual Partnership Action Plans and the adoption of the

Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, which will be adapted to the member's Prague Capabilities Commitment.

The European Union launched a 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force in 2001, is supposed to be up and running by 2003, but is struggling amid budget restrictions and affected by post-September 11 events, the war in Afghanistan and against Iraq. After the end of the East-West Conflict European deficiencies of military capabilities became more and more visible, however. One important reason lies in the legacy of the Cold War. During this period the European armies prepared for a confrontation with the major threat from the East in a collective effort to defend their territories. The conflicts and challenges after the end of the military bipolarity do not require massive, heavy-metal European armies, not suited for transport and projections to distant places, but rapid reaction forces with flexible structure and light weapons, deployable over great distances, equipped with modern communication assets to coordinate their actions, surveillance and reconnaissance facilities.

A draft (continuously changing) report of the Presidium the European Convention provides recommendations and the wording of new articles for the Treaty of The Convention. The report recognizes that the concept of security is very broad, by nature indivisible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects covering not only the security of states but also the security of citizens. The European Security and Defense Policy is based of this broad concept of security. It allows the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management.

The draft proposes specific provisions for implementing the common foreign, security, and defense policy. It shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defense policy. This could lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides is in accordance with the Member States' respective constitutional requirements.

- The tasks of the Union include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may also contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

- The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a *group of Member States* in order to maintain the Union's values and serve its interests.
- Member States whose military capabilities meet higher criteria and can make more binding commitments to one another can establish a *structured cooperation*. A European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency will assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
- Member States may participate in a *closer cooperation*. If one of the participating states is the victim of armed aggression the other participating states shall give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power.
- Some member States (at least one third) may also wish to establish *enhanced cooperation* among them to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its integration process.
- A proposed *Solidarity Clause* shall prevent the terrorist threat. Should a Member State fall victim to a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities.

All these provisions offer a high degree of flexibility and would make it possible for Member States to engage in "coalitions of the willing." The provisions are optional (maybe except the Solidarity Clause). They bind only those Member States that so wish to take up in the Union framework the structured, closer, or enhanced cooperation. For Austria the draft so far leaves its options open. It may either stay out of these provisions or participate. In the first case keeps some freedom to act autonomously though this limits Austria's impact within these institutions. A full participation will have consequences for Austria's status of neutrality. A participation in the *closer cooperation* would mean its abandonment.

In the area of crisis management there is the danger of duplication of NATO and EU capabilities and missions. Division of labor and role specialization could avoid it on the one hand, and cooperation in certain areas such as common command structure for crisis management on the other. There must be appropriate division of labour, however. The wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq showed that the overwhelming U.S. contribution is war-fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. This gap of the military capabilities between the U.S. and the rest of the

world is huge and is growing. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. Europeans are more designed for peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. There should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. European states should keep a minimum level of participation in all phases of an operation including the more demanding ones. As Europeans should keep and develop some war fighting capability U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end peace support operations. The administration should give up its unwillingness to contribute troops for “constabulary” duties and “nation-building”. The U.S. forces should not be reduced to war fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations. Such a “qualified division of labour” means that the Europeans concentrate more on the smaller-scale operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum with some U.S. participation, and some European contribution in crises where enforcement capabilities are required.

NATO and the EU are exploring ways to further develop our cooperation on questions of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, including in civil emergency planning, capability enhancement and the fight against terrorism. The NATO’s strategic Partnership with the European Union has been formalised in the groundbreaking Berlin Plus arrangements. Hence, despite the transatlantic differences, there is clearly consensus among some of the EU Member States and the United States on the need to develop force planning and strategies for “ad-hoc coalitions of the willing” that can have access to NATO and EU economic, military and human assets. Europeans do not live on Venus and Americans not on Mars, Europeans not in a Kantian and Americans not in a Hobbsian world, both live on the planet earth and in the same world.